The current model of adult neurogenesis in mammals suggests that adult‐born neurons are generated by stem cells that undergo long‐term self‐renewal, and that a lifetime supply of stem cells resides in the brain. In contrast, it has recently been demonstrated that adult‐born neurons in crayfish are generated by precursors originating in the immune system. This is particularly interesting because studies done many years ago suggest that a similar mechanism might exist in rodents and humans, with bone marrow providing stem cells (...) that can generate neurons. However, the relevance of these findings for natural mechanisms underlying adult neurogenesis in mammals is not clear, because of uncertainties at many levels. We argue here that the recent findings in crayfish send a strong signal to re‐examine existing data from rodents and humans, and to design new experiments that will directly test the contributions of the immune system to adult neurogenesis in mammals. (shrink)

Here I craft a case for recognizing the roots and patterns that ground the possibility of contemporary com-posting—as outlined in Donna Haraway’s Staying with the Trouble—by New Materialists and critical pragmatists, especially those who are affected by the social injustices and ill-advised practices of today’s formal education. I explore both Spinozan Ethics and American pragmatism in order to fashion a pattern that affects educational thought and action. That pattern of affect/affecting is one Haraway calls “attunement”, a state of co-relation that (...) makes “unexpected feats possible.” My goal is to encourage those educational theorists who dwell in a critical pragmatist archive and those who dwell in a New Materialist archive to “make kin,” to learn to play string figures with a companion species, as they com-post educational possibility in a world where agency is both more limited and more widely-distributed. (shrink)

This collection breaks new ground in four key areas of feminist social thought: the sex/gender debates; challenges to liberalism/equality; feminist ethics; and feminist perspectives on global ethics and politics in the 21st century. Altogether, the essays provide an innovative look at feminist philosophy while making substantive contributions to current debates in gender theory, ethics, and political thought.

Here I shine light on the concept of and call for safe space and on the implicit argument that seems to undergird both the concept and the call, complicating and problematizing the taken for granted view of this issue with the goal of revealing a more complex dynamic worthy of interpretive attention when determining educational response. I maintain that the usual justification for safe space covers rather than clarifies the logic of safe space and makes it difficult for an educator (...) to respond to harassment in a constructive and fitting way. I also claim that calls for safe space can only be properly interpreted—and responded to—when the link between fear and safety is uncovered and deconstructed. In the process, I note that the assumption of “safety” as a “positive condition” for education is problematic and warrants careful consideration. (shrink)

The call to re-envision theoretical psychology comes after more than a half century of theorists’ efforts to re-envision psychological science. Especially prominent is persistent critique of mainstream psychology’s deployment of the ontological and epistemic templates of the natural sciences, in theorists’ multifaceted mission to replace that metatheoretical grounding with one deemed properly suited to a thoroughgoing psychological science of lived experience. Despite anticipated objection, I call for consideration of boundary-pushing trends and challenges in the natural sciences, especially in theory and (...) philosophy of physics, with an eye toward inspiring theoretical psychologists and mainstream psychologists anew. I also draw attention to the use of relevant findings of mainstream psychological scientists by philosophers of psychology who ask traditional philosophical questions nonetheless. This use mirrors the use of relevant findings of biological scientists by philosophers of biology within the burgeoning field of biophilosophy, in which I find an apt analogue to what I herein call “psycphilosophy.” By adopting a more mutual, relational attitude toward disciplines that have heretofore been dismissed, theoretical psychologists may attain a better position from which to make more constructive and productive contact with mainstream psychological scientists—contact that may facilitate the impact on the mainstream that has to date eluded theorists. (shrink)

How have spokespersons for the positive psychology movement presented the movement to the public and to the profession of psychology? Moreover, what are the consequences for psychology of that presentation? These questions inform my assessment of the "virtues" of positive psychology, which I interpret in two ways. First, there are the ways in which the movement implicitly presents itself as virtuous, not least by constituting itself as a corrective to "negative psychology." Second, there are the ways in which Martin Seligman, (...) in calling for a new and discrete scientific enterprise, promotes building "signature strengths" as routes to virtue and thus "authentic happiness." Alternative ways to conceptualize virtue and authenticity are considered, as are the epistemic problems that inhere in movements in general, and the positive psychology movement in particular. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

At present, the structures, practice, and discourse of schooling are anchored to a “commercial spirit” that understands students, educators, and parents as economic operators trading competitively in human capital and to a discourse of failure that is disabling those who seek to understand and enact John Dewey's notion of education as democratic practice. Here Barbara Stengel illustrates both the commercial spirit in public schools and the discourse of school failure across two geopolitical settings: Shanghai, China, and urban U.S. schools. (...) She argues that framing the educational enterprise in terms of economic success and failure makes it difficult for educators to address Dewey's vision of democracy and education substantively. Stengel concludes with an acknowledgment that, regardless of putative political commitments, these two public school systems are schooling — though not often educating — the same neoliberal subject, but that Dewey's vision of democracy and education nonetheless remains critical and compelling. (shrink)

Alice laughed. "There's no use trying," she said: "one can't believe impossible things.""I daresay you haven't had much practice," said the Queen. "When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast."In the wake of the November 2016 presidential election, countless commentators recognized what Richard Rorty knew in 1998, that the U.S. democratic system would crack under the weight of social and economic inequalities and inequities— (...) and that those cracking the safe would be not the historically marginalized but the historically privileged. Hear Rorty nearly 20 years ago: [M]embers of labor unions, and unorganized unskilled... (shrink)

The author critiques postmodern/narrative theory, with its underlying antirealist/constructivist philosophy that the knower makes rather than discovers reality. As an alternative, she introduces readers to the integrative/eclective therapy movement and proposes "modest realism".

Do mainstream psychologists think critically? And are the many critiques of the mainstream made by its critics “on target”? Answering both questions requires consensus about what critical thinking consists in, and there seems to be little consensus in sight. I begin by accepting Slife, Yanchar, and Reber's claim that “rigorous thinking” itself is insufficient for critical thinking in and about psychology, and I then consider various suggestions made by critics of the mainstream about thematic assumptions that should be included in (...) critical thinking about the mainstream. After identifying three areas of mainstream research in which some of these assumptions seem to have been challenged from within the mainstream, I conclude by considering how both critique and metacritique may be combined, repositioned, and/or recontextualized, to advance the important cause of critical thinking in and about psychology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Rationality or reason, traditionally conceived as a universal, essential human faculty, is out of favor these days. Its defenders are few, compared to its many challengers. The challengers are not those who lament the decline of reason but rather those who express an egalitarian impulse, in their determination to refute universal, essential ideals of reason. These challengers are a diverse lot and sometimes prefer to speak instead of “rationalities” , or what Shweder called “divergent rationalities.” This paper considers the question (...) whether this trend toward divergent rationalities is itself reasonable. To answer this question, the paper begins with some standard definitions of rationality or reason, on the understanding that any such standard is what stands in question. This is followed by recent work of Evnine that demonstrates just how our personhood logically entails universal epistemic “dimensions,” some of which are normative, rational dimensions. Evidence that Nisbett and Shweder muster to challenge a universal rationality is then considered, ending with a defense of just that which is challenged. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

We humans laugh often and it is not always because something is funny. We laugh in the face of the pathetic or the powerless; sometimes we laugh at our own powerlessness or pathos.In short, we laugh at both the comical and the difficult. Here I am especially interested in the laughter that is sparked by what is difficult and how that laughter—and all laughter—breaks through to mark a range of emotional states: fear, nervousness, shame, confusion and others not viewed as (...) positive, as well as joy, delight, interest, relief and other states that are viewed as positive. I also am interested in understanding what and how laughter reveals and what and how it conceals. As I explore both interests in this article, I make a compound point about laughter in educational settings: that laughter marks a breakdown of experience and that same laughter creates space for reflective listening and thinking, for diffusion of difficult affect, and for the disruption of habit that makes growth possible (and even likely) if that laughter is taken seriously. (shrink)